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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE : CONTENDING THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE
By
Ryan Thomas*
I.   INTRODUCTION
International Arbitration & Global Governance: Contending Theories and
Evidence (“Arbitration and Governance”) is edited by Walter Mattli and Thomas
Dietz.1 The authors wrote this book in order to present contending theories of
arbitration in a way that they believed would be more accessible to a wider academic
audience, as opposed to most of the literature concerning arbitration, which the authors
view as overly practice-orientated and technical.2 The authors’ goal in assembling
this work was to expand the realm of arbitration literature beyond volumes
written almost exclusively by arbitrators, for arbitrators and other insiders.3 The
authors perceive that this narrow analysis of arbitration has failed to adequately
examine the arbitral process conceptually or even critically.4 To remedy this, the
authors have assembled a collection of scholarly articles that aim to take a broader look
at the social and geopolitical consequences of international arbitration.5
The book is a useful tool for any law student looking to expand their
understanding of international arbitration and the effect that the continued expansion
of this field has had, and will continue to have, on global governance and the roles of
state actors. The authors have made the material accessible, even to those outside the
field of law, by utilizing an essay format approach that is light on arbitral verbiage. At
239 pages, the book is a relatively quick read and at under $40 it is an inexpensive
addition to any class on arbitration.

*

Ryan Thomas is an Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2016 Juris
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law.
1

WALTER MATTLI & THOMAS DIETZ, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:
CONTENDING THEORIES AND EVIDENCE (2014). (This work consists of a collection of scholarly articles
that, while not all written by the same authors, examines the ways in which international arbitration serves
as a type of trans-national governance).
2

Walter Mattli is a Professor of International Political Economy and Fellow of St. John’s College at the
University of Oxford. He is nationally recognized for his work in financial policy and economics. Thomas
Dietz is an Associate Professor in Politics and Law at the University of Muenster, and a Research Fellow as
well as a member of the Law Faculty at Wolfson College at Oxford. He is a noted scholar of International
Politics, International Law and Global Governance.
3
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II. OVERVIEW
Arbitration and Governance is comprised of nine chapters.6 Each chapter
is relatively autonomous from the next with very little referencing between the
chapters. All of the chapters attempt to address new and expanding roles of
international arbitration as a form of global governance and an alternative to the
relief that has traditionally been provided by national courts. Based on the
organizational structure the editors chose, selecting scholarly articles with a small
number of overarching topics, the reader gets the impression that the authors have
opted for an approach that attacks the topic from all sides with minor
coordination, instead of a more orderly and focused approach to the topic.
However, this may be precisely the approach the authors intended because, as the
authors have made abundantly clear, this book is not supposed to read like every
other volume on arbitration. Rather, the editors intended to present the material in
a new and novel way that traditional students of arbitration are not accustomed to
seeing.
In chapter 1, Mattli and Dietz discuss what they see as the four main
models of arbitration governance and the societal and governmental impacts of
each model.7 In chapter 2, Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel argue that
arbitration has reached a critical point, caught between being an agent of the two
parties and the wider transnational business and investment community.8 In
chapter 3, Ralf Michaels examines the different roles that arbitrators are assigned
by the parties to play in the arbitral process as well as the roles that arbitrators
assume for themselves.9 In chapter 4, Joshua Karton examines the legal culture
surrounding arbitration that he argues is essential to the development of
arbitration as a form of governance.10 In chapter 5, Moritz Renner discusses the
problems with opting out of state law in favor of a private legal system and the
public policy issues that this process creates.11 In chapter 6, Claire Cutler argues
that the development of international arbitration is a part of a concerted effort by
the ruling capitalist powers to exempt themselves from State laws in favor of their
own private laws that they can create and apply.12 In chapter 7, Thomas Dietz
compares universal arbitration with specialized arbitration, finding the specialized

6

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 1-239.

7

Id. at 1-21.

8

Id. at 22-46.

9

Id. at 47-73.
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Id. at 74-116.
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MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 117-39.
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form of arbitration to be superior.13 In chapter 8, Thomas Hale analyzes the effect
that the ratification of the 1958 New York Convention on the Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards has on a countries’ foreign trade, finding that ratification
does in fact increase trade.14 Lastly, in chapter 9, Horatia Muir Watt explores
ways in which host states can introduce social and economic rights within the
investment arbitration forum, a forum that she argues has until now excluded
those rights.15
Each chapter is relatively self-contained. However, the editors seem to
have selected authors and articles strategically. By doing so, they build toward the
general principle that as international arbitration continues to grow in popularity
and becomes increasingly unbound from State actors, the arbitration field will
have to develop a culture and policies to govern itself. These policies must balance
the economic and judicial independence that has made arbitration so
appealing with wider social policy concerns.
III. MAPPING AND ASSESSING THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN THE GLOBALIZATION ERA : AN INTRODUCTION
Chapter one begins with an analysis of the rising popularity of arbitration
over the last decade.16 Unsatisfied with the vague, overarching term of
“arbitration,” the authors proceed to break arbitration down into three main types
of arbitration that take place on a wide scale. The first type is universal
arbitration.17 This type of arbitration is primarily handled by the five major
arbitration houses which accept cases from a broad range of companies in many
different industries.18 The second type of arbitration is specialized arbitration.19
13

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 168-95.

14

Id. at 196-13.

15

Id. at 214-239.

16

M ATTLI & D IETZ , supra note 1 at 2-3 (you can make this an id cite initially)(the authors use data from the
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre to show that the number of cases submitted to the five major
arbitration houses, which they identify as the International Court of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International Arbitration, the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the Singapore International Arbitration Center, and the International
Center for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration Association, have grown steadily and should
continue to trend upwards. In 1992, 606 cases were submitted to the five major arbitration houses. By 2011,
the five major arbitration houses were handling 2368 cases. Over that same time, the International Center
for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration Association has seen the largest growth.)
17

Id. at 2.

18

M ATTLI & D IETZ , supra note 1, at 2 (These five arbitration houses, which are organizations that employ
arbitrators, offer general arbitration and handle a large portion of all arbitration cases).
19

Id.
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This type of arbitration is industry specific and open to only those that are
members of the industry, such as the Society of Maritime Arbitration.20 The third
type of arbitration that the authors identify is investor-state arbitration (ISA.)21
ISA primarily concerns the ever expanding realm of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), a type of treaty in which one of the parties to the dispute is the host
state.22 The authors argue that the rise in ISA constitutes a form of global
governance that presents the parties with a type of transnational private authority
by which the parties may resolve their disputes.23 The authors argue and present
four main models by which field of arbitration is governed.
The first of these models is the Economic-Rationalist Model.24 This model
posits that as transactions become more economically complex, equally complex
systems emerge to govern them to make them more efficient.25 Therefore, as
international commercial transactions have grown in complexity, international
commercial arbitration has emerged as a governance structure that possess the
requisite flexibility, technical expertise, privacy, confidentiality, and speed to
allow these transactions to operate efficiently.26 The International Court of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce is a prime example of the
Economic-Rationalist model.27 By employing a highly professional team of
arbitrators that can be replaced for poor performance and whom yield tremendous
power in an arbitral dispute, the ICC has created a highly effective system in
which only approximately 5% of it’s awards are challenged.28 So few awards are
challenged, in part, due to the reputational integrity of the ICC, as well as the risk
20

M ATTLI & D IETZ , supra note 1, at 2 (unlike universal arbitration, specialized arbitration is only open to
the members of the field in question. This forces members to be accountable to one another and ensures
that disputes will be resolved by arbitrators with the requisite knowledge of the field).
21

Id. (Investor-state arbitration removes the dispute from the real of a national court, which an investor
may rightfully fear would favor the state).
22

Id. at 3.

23

Id. at 5.

24

Id. at 7; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (New York: Free Press, 1975).
(discussing how organization structures built into the contractual process are used as a form of
governance).
25

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 7.

26

Id.

27

See Walter Mattli, “Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration,” International
Organization 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): pp. 919-47 [I don’t really know what this source is look at Rule 16
in the bluebook – I think this might be the rule you need]; see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of
Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. M IAMI L. R EV . 773.
28
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that a party will ruin its own reputation in international circles if it fails to comply
with an ICC verdict.29 While certainly beneficial to international corporate parties,
the Economic-Rationalist model also benefits society at large by creating positive
externalities, namely, by enabling the efficient operation of global markets, which
in turn allocate global resources most efficiently.30
The second model of arbitration governance that is presented is the
Cultural-Sociological model. While similar in many ways to the EconomicRationalist model, the Cultural-Sociological model argues that the former is
incomplete and overly simplistic.31 The Cultural-Sociological model argues that a
strong legal culture common to the arbitration community is necessary to explain
the emergence of ICA (International Commercial Arbitration).32 First, all
members of the community are dedicated to internationalism, in that they prefer a
global system of governance over local laws. 33 Second, they believe in the
superiority of private adjudication over national courts. .34 Lastly, members of the
community generally favor the business community.35 These traits lead to a
culture in which ICA is seen as a “positive-sum” arrangement that benefits not
only the parties involved in the dispute, but the global society at large.36
The third model of arbitration governance that is discussed is the PowerBased Model. This model argues that modern ICA is a result of powerful
companies and organization utilizing their superior bargaining power in the
contractual process to create a system in which the powerful party is always
favored.37 This model takes a grim view of arbitration, seeing it as a way for the
powerful to take advantage of the weak.38
29

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 8; see also Gerald Aksen, Ad Hoc Versus Institutional Arbitration, 1
ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN 2, p. 22 (1991)
30

Id. at 9.

31

Id. at 10.

32

Id; see also Joshua Karton, International Arbitration Culture and Global Governance, WALTER MATTLI
& THOMAS DIETZ, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CONTENDING THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE (2014) P. 74-116.
33

Id.

34

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1,at 10.

35

Id.

36

See MATTLI & DIETZ, Figure 1.6 p. 9.

37

See Thomas Dietz, Does International Commercial Arbitration Provide Efficient Contract Enforcement
Institutions for International Trade?, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:
CONTENDING THEORIES AND EVIDENCE p. 168-195.
38

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 14
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The last model that is discussed is the Constitutionalization model. This
model is characterized by a system of both domestic and international norms that
guide the decision making process of arbitrators, as well as a combining of law
and politics.39 This model largely seems to presume that arbitrators bring with
them an eye towards wider social policy objectives that influence their decision
making.
The chapter ends with a brief summary of the proceeding chapters as well
as some suggestions for further research.40 The key questions raised for further
research include: a concern that arbitration is creating a private legal authority, an
analysis of the respective winners and losers in the arbitration process, and an
examination of the conditions that contribute to the constitutionalization of global
governance.41
The chapter serves as an effective roadmap of the chapters to follow.
Additionally, it does an excellent job of giving a very brief overview of the
general principles of the arbitration field, as well as some of the leading models of
the field. The authors make effective use of charts to explain their observations.
Lastly, the chapter seems indicative of their overall goal: to present arbitration in
a way that is widely accessible to a large number of readers. This chapter is far
less academic and much easier to read than a typical law review article.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION : DELEGATION ,
JUDICIALIZATION, GOVERNANCE
Written by Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Gisel, this chapter discusses the
pressure that the continued expansion of transnational commerce has placed on
ICA to develop more defined governing structures, especially in regards to
disclosing arbitral awards.42 The authors’ approach combines two main theories:
judicialization and principal-agent theory.43 Judicialization refers to a process by
which governance structures emerge and adapt to meet the needs of those that
utilize the system44. The principal-agent theory posits that as ICA continues to
grow, the principal-agent relationship between the parties and the arbitrator will
expand to include the international business community at large. Proceeding from
a combination of the judicialization and the principal-agent theories, the authors

39

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 14-15.

40

Id. at 16-21.

41

Id. at 21.

42

Id. at 23.

43

Id. at 24.

44

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 24.
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develop three distinct models of arbitral governance that define modern
arbitration.45
The first model is the Contractual model. Parties to arbitration will be held
to the terms that they contractually agreed upon.46 Therefore, once the arbitration
proceeding begins, the arbitrator’s decision is bound by what the parties have
agreed to, giving the parties very little control over the arbitrator.47 However as a
neutral third party, the arbitrator does have a set of obligations towards the parties
that he must fulfill. First, the arbitrator must render an accurate award that is in
line with what the parties agreed to contractually.48 Second, due process must be
ensured so as to strengthen the perception that the arbitrator is truly impartial in the
matter.49 Third, the arbitrator must render a decision efficiently, that is without
unnecessary costs or delays.50 Lastly, the arbitrator must render an award that is
enforceable, in that it would survive scrutiny by a national judge should one of the
parties challenge the award.51 International Arbitration survives and continues to
grow because good arbitrators hold not only the parties, but also themselves, to the
contractual terms.52
The second model is the Judicial Model. This model diverges from the
contractual model in that it assumes that arbitrators have a duty to resolve
disputes in ways that take into account broader social interests of society.53 While
arbitrators have broad authority to resolve disputes between parties, they must
also be mindful of their relationship with national courts which can vacate their

45

M ATTLI & D IETZ , supra note 1, at 23 (stating that although the authors have chosen to analyze the
problem in this way, they acknowledge that this analysis is certainly not the only way, or even the best way
to analyze the issue and that the authors intend not to take a stand on the normative issues raised in the
analysis).
46

Id. at 29.

47

Id. at 30 (explaining that courts have given a great deal of deference to arbitrators and will allow the
arbitrator the ability to determine much of his own jurisdiction). See also Attorneys as Arbitrators, 39 J.
Legal Stud. 109.
48

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 30.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id. at 31.

53

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 31.
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awards but can also expand their role.54 In order to maintain as much autonomy as
possible from the national courts, the authors argue that arbitrators will perform
their duties with not only the contractual parties in mind, but also with an eye
towards the larger social community.55 This view of the arbitrator as less of a
contractual referee and as more of a global judge substantially differs from the
traditional understanding of the role of the arbitrator.
The last model is the Constitutional model. This model asserts that the
arbitrator is not merely an independent actor, but a part of a wider international
legal order.56 Two core claims form the basis of the model. The first is that broad
ranging international treaties have created a complex relationship between
arbitrators, national law, and international law.57 In particular, the authors point to
the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards as demonstrating that private arbitrators are, in fact, agents of a
broader legal community.58 The second claim is that the framework of ICA is a
part of an emerging international economic constitution that all international
commercial actors are subject to.59 As this constitution continues to expand and
develop, the authors argue that it will have to be able to take into account basic
human rights, such as property rights and due process, that will affect the way
future arbitration panels make decisions. In sum, the model argues that as
arbitration becomes more constitutional, it will have to take into account broader
national, transnational, and international norms and needs.60
The chapter ends with a brief discussion on the extent to which ICA is
becoming an autonomous legal system, concluding that although the system
thrives on independence, it still requires state power to ultimately enforce its
decisions.61 Consequently, to keep itself within the good graces of the national
courts needed to ultimately back its decisions, the arbitral process will be forced
to develop and include certain societal norms of the global community.62
54

M ATTLI & D IETZ , supra note 1, at 32; See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc.,
473 US 614 (1985) (in which the United States Supreme Court allowed an arbitration panel in Japan to
apply United States anti-trust law, while still retaining the ability of the Court to review future applications
of United States law by foreign arbitrators).
55

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 33,

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 34

59

Id.

60

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 36

61

Id. at 43.

62

Id. at 45.
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This chapter is extremely well written and it is very easy to follow the
argument that is laid out. The models presented are well supported and not only
help to explain the rise of international arbitration, but also provide a framework
for where the field is likely to go in the future.
V. ROLES AND ROLE PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS
In the third chapter of this book, Ralf Michaels examines not only the
roles that contracting parties assign to the arbitrator, but also the roles that
arbitrators take upon themselves.63 In particular, Michaels focuses on how these
roles adapt and evolve to changes within the arbitral system over time.64 Michaels
structures his analysis by focusing on the role of the arbitrator as both a national
and global citizen, as both a scholar and a practitioner, and as both a public and
private agent.65
As the expansion of ICA continues, arbitrators are frequently caught
between their roles as a national and a global actor.66 This contrast manifests itself
in surprisingly basic ways.67 For example, while choice of law was traditionally
left to the parties to freely contract, newer approaches to the ICA have allowed a
greater deference to arbitrators to choose the appropriate rule of law.68 Because the
arbitrator does not have a strong enforcement option, he is somewhat
necessarily tied to the international legal system.69 Past attempts to sever this
connection between the arbitrator and the traditional legal system have not been
successful.70 Therefore, the arbitrator is forced by necessity to take on a
transnational role.71 Michaels continues his analysis of the arbitrator as a global
actor through a sociological lens. Michaels argues that as a remarkably small
community made up of mostly repeat actors, the international arbitration
community is one built upon shared values that influence decision making.72
63

64

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 47
Id . at 48.

65

Id.

66

Id. at 49.

67

Id. at 50.

68

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 50.

69

Id. at 51.

70

Id. at 51.

71

Id. at 52.

72

Id.
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Michaels claims that, much like a cartel, the international arbitration community
works together to provide a consistent process that is difficult for outsiders to enter
into.73 By working together, the community ensures that international arbitration
remains legitimate and indispensable.74 Michaels concludes this analysis
of arbitrators as global actors by emphasizing that domestic courts, and in
particular the United States Supreme Court, have largely left transnational
adjudication to the realm of arbitration.75
Michaels next analyzes the role of the arbitrator as both a practitioner and
a scholar. Leading arbitrators in the past gained prestige from their venerated
status as a definitive authority.76 In the modern era of arbitration with increasing
competition from other arbitration houses and from national courts, arbitrators
have continued to rely on this perceived expertise to attract clients, selling
themselves as better, more competent versions of existing state courts.77 Going
back to his analogy of ICA as a cartel, Michaels posits that the arbitration
community uses this reputational advantage and perception of professionalism to
keep newcomers out of the field.78 The arbitration community also discourages
newcomers from entering the field by keeping the level of complexity
exceedingly high.79 Few individuals may enter the field because of the highly
specialized scholarship that is required.80
Michaels concludes his analysis by examining the contrast between the
arbitrator as both a private and public actor. The arbitrator must balance his role
as a service provider to the parties with his role as a quasi-judge, though this
status does not necessarily connect him with a particular state.81 A problem
emerges as the arbitrator must provide the service that the parties have contracted
for, while being mindful of his judicial role in a wider system of global
governance.82 This balance is especially difficult to maintain because it is the

73

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 54.

74

Id at 56.

75

Id. at 57.

76

Id. at 59.

77

MATTLI & DIETZ supra note 1, at 60.

78

Id. at 62.

79

Id. at 65.

80

Id. at 68.

81

Id. at 69.

82

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 71.
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independence from the state and the public interest that partly makes arbitration
so attractive.83
Michaels concludes by summarizing the various pressures that
international arbitration faces from both state courts as well as private
mediation.84
The main argument of this chapter seems to be that in order to maintain
the advantage that arbitration currently enjoys over these other processes, the role
of the arbitrator will have to continue to develop and define itself. This
development must take place in such a way that the traditional appeal of
arbitration as an independent process is preserved, while the emerging role of a
quasi-judge is respected. This chapter effectively outlines and supports that
argument.
VI. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CULTURE

AND

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Written by Joshua Karton, chapter four examines the effect that culture
has on the emergence of ICA as a form of global governance and in shaping the
form that the system of government ultimately takes.85 The majority of Karton’s
observations comes from a series of interviews that he conducted in 2012 with
twenty international commercial arbitrators.86 While the interviews were
conducted anonymously, Karton assures the reader that the interviewees are
leading experts in their field based on lists from Chambers and Partners, as well
as Who’s Who Legal.87
Karton begins his analysis by arguing that it is a common shared culture
that forms the basis for international arbitration as a form of governance.88 Karton
defines culture as a shared set of practices, interests, values, goals and attitudes
that a group shares.89 Importantly, Karton argues that these key aspects of a
culture are expressed reflexively, that is to say that judges may be expressing them
almost automatically without being fully conscious of what they are doing.90
83

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 71.

84

Id. at 73. (State courts as well as mediation continue to compete with arbitration for cases, especially
cases with broad social and economic implications).
85

Id. at 79.

86

Id. at 80.

87

Id. (Both of these sources are respected publications in the field of international law and arbitration).

88

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 83.

89

Id. at 84.

90

Id.
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Karton moves on to identify some of the basic aspects of culture that all
arbitrators share.91 They tend to have elite educations, they usually develop their
careers in large corporate firms that are typically Anglo-American, and they
frequently travel in both academic and business circles.92 This shared experience
attracts like-minded individuals that share the same background and ways of
thinking.93 While this is persuasive, Karton identifies that his own analysis may
have a major flaw: ICA has only existed in its modern form for roughly three
generations.94 This short amount of time may not be sufficient for the
organization to fully develop a culture.95 However, with arbitration’s position in
the world economy firmly solidified for the foreseeable future, it is highly
plausible that such a culture will fully develop and will likely be based on the
shared values and norms of those presently in the field.
After establishing that arbitrators share certain cultural norms, or at the
very least that such norms are being developed and implemented, Karton
addresses the ways in which that shared culture affect arbitral decisions. The
primary effect that culture seems to have is that it encourages internationalism, a
form of governance that promotes uniform international rules and practices.96
Though 97.7% of arbitration contracts contain a choice of law provision,97
arbitrators tend to favor international rules over national ones regardless of the
contractual parties wishes.98 Karton points to the UNCITRAL Model Law as an
example of a worldwide consensus on several fundamental aspects of the
arbitration practice that have grown out of this desire for internationalism.99 As
the field of arbitration continues to attract young cosmopolitan lawyers that share
many of these same transnational beliefs and ideas, the effects of these cultural
norms will only continue to grow stronger.100 Based on his interviews, Karton
91

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 87.

92

Id. at 93.

93

This seems to harken back to Michaels idea of arbitration as an industry that uses its shared values to
limit the number of outsides that can enter, or at least exerts pressure on new members to conform to the
existing value hierarchy.
94

Id. at 95.

95

Id. at 95.

96

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 96.

97

Id. at 100.

98

Id. at 100.

99

Id. at 103.

100

Id. at 105.
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asserts that there is a growing understanding within the arbitrational community
that tribunals assume that as long as parties agree to be bound by this form of
dispute resolution, the parties are also agreeing to be bound by the applicable
trade usages and norms that are developed within the field.101
Karton concludes his analysis by reflecting on the impact that the
continued growth of a defined arbitration culture will have on the emergence of a
system of global governance.102 A common legal culture that is shared and
accepted by the majority of the practitioners in the field lends a measure of
consistency and predictability to the field, a necessary step in the continued
development of arbitration as a system of global governance.103
Karton succeeds in introducing the idea that the culture of arbitration can
and will be a part of any form of governance that the field develops. Arbitrators,
like any other group, will eventually have to develop a system of norms by which
to operate. Identifying those norms and shaping them will be an important part of
the continued growth of international arbitration.
VII. PRIVATE JUSTICE, PUBLIC POLICY : THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Chapter five is written by Moritz Renner and concerns the potential
problems from a public policy perspective of allowing international commercial
actors to opt out of domestic legal systems through private agreements.
Arbitration remains preferable to domestic legal systems because it allows for a
higher degree of confidentiality, efficiency, flexibility, neutrality, and can be much
more cost effective.104 However, one of the primary ways that this flexibility
and independence is achieved is by separating the arbitral process from domestic
conflict-of-law rules.105 These factors combine to create a system in
which the international arbitrator, through the contracting process, is bound by the
will of the parties at hand and is not a guardian of any singular state’s public
policy in the way that judges of national courts are.106

101

MATTLI & DIETZ, supra note 1, at 113.

102

Id. at 116.

103

Id.

104

Id. at 117.

105

Id. at 120.

106

M ATTLI & D IETZ , supra note 1, at 123; See also Yves Derains, Public Policy and the Law Applicable to
the Dispute in International Arbitration, in Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in
Arbitration, edited by Pieter Sanders, pp. 227-256, 240-241 (1987) (explaining that the arbitrator is an
agent of the parties, not of any broader state policy).
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One of the main differences that sets international arbitration apart from
domestic law is that in domestic law, case-law and precedent provide a degree of
guidance to judges deciding similar cases in the future.107 The confidentiality and
flexibility that makes arbitration such an attractive form of dispute resolution also
make it very difficult to achieve the same kind of guiding principles.
To rectify this issue, Renner proposes two solutions. Either arbitrators
could refrain entirely from applying mandatory norms, in which case arbitrators
would have the freedom to apply rules as they see fit, or the arbitration
community could develop its own strategies for applying a set of mandatory
norms.108 Faced with this decision, the arbitration community has chosen to move
towards instituting its own mandatory norms.109
The key difficulty in developing these norms is maintaining the delicate
balance between state and private interests.110 Some tribunals have routinely held
that the contractual choice of law provision trumps all other provisions.111 This
need to balance public and private interests creates a system in which even norms
that are considered “mandatory” or part of a wider “public policy” can be
contracted around by a party wishing to abridge these norms.112
One of the ways to get around this is to support the continued
constitutionalization of the arbitration process.113 To achieve this support, it is
necessary to construct a hierarchy of norms that brings together both law and
politics.114 This system is built around transnational public policy that moves the
arbitration process away from the traditional autonomy that arbitration has
enjoyed, and towards a more globally regulated system.115 The hope is that this
system will better address the emerging public policy concerns that have made the
critics of arbitration skeptical of its ability to create positive externalities for the
global community.
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The author concludes this chapter by acknowledging that there is a risk
that as arbitral tribunals start to act more like domestic court systems, the
arbitration process will lose its appeal as a truly “alternative” form of dispute
resolution.116 To be successful, arbitration must adapt norms in such a way that
the underlying appeal of arbitration is maintained while continuing to adapt to and
respect emerging state related interests.117
This chapter does a fine job of explaining the delicate balance that
arbitration must maintain between public and private interests. The author warns
that if arbitration does not maintain its autonomy, it may ultimately lose its appeal
as a form of dispute resolution. Hopefully, the field heeds this warning and takes
steps to preserve its place within our legal system.
VIII.

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE , AND THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM

Written by Claire Cutler, chapter six discusses the constitutionalization of the
arbitral process. The author begins the chapter by arguing that international commercial
arbitration is a key element to new constitutionalism and that it is in place to defend the
continued expansion of capitalism and legitimize the private resolution of commercial
disputes.118 The author sees the arbitrator as a part of a mercatocracy, a system of
transnational merchants governing themselves, that forms the merchant class that created
arbitration as a system of governance for itself.119
The author then further expands on her analysis of international arbitration as a
system aimed at the continued expansion of capitalism.120 Due to the expansion of
international arbitration and the organization of bilateral investment treaties (BITs),
foreign investors now have more options than ever before when dealing with host
nations.121 By drawing dispute resolution out of the realm of national courts and into an
international forum, foreign investors get a greater degree of certainty that they will be
treated fairly and equitably, as opposed to having to litigate the matters in the national
courts of the host state.122 Some commentators argue that this move to delocalize and
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privatize these forms of dispute resolution leads to a “democratic deficit.”123 With the
dispute out of the domestic courts, the host state is unable to create legislation at will that
would affect these relationships, leading to a substantial loss of state sovereignty.124
Additionally, this system gives the appearance of privileging international commerce over
local commerce, as economic actors will prefer to settle disputes in arbitration, rather
than risk having to litigate in state courts.125 The author goes on to call the belief that
depoliticization is necessary to settle international trade and investment disputes is a myth
put forward by the international arbitration regime.126 The author ends her analysis
by noting that several countries, including Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have
withdrawn from investor-state arbitration over public policy concerns.127
The author’s main issue with international commercial arbitration seems to be that
by transferring investor-state relations to impartial third parties, states will lose out to
powerful investors that will construct the system to their favor.128
While the author does make a fair point about states losing some autonomy in the
arbitration process, it seems simple enough to remedy. During the bargaining process,
countries could include a choice of law provision in the contract that selects their own
system of laws. This party focused solution seems much simpler and honors the intent of
the contracting parties much better than a new system of constitutionalism that would
require wide reaching regulations that would seem to rob international arbitration of the
flexibility and autonomy that has made it a successful, desirable alternative to state
courts.
IX. DOES INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PROVIDE EFFICIENT CONTRACT
ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE ?
Written by Thomas Dietz, this chapter challenges the prevailing view of
an upsurge in the number of cases that are taken to arbitration.129 Dietz breaks the
chapter into three fundamental parts. The first part is descriptive and argues that
the overall caseload of the major arbitration houses is still too small to constitute a
type of governance. Part two attempts to explain these findings further. Lastly, part
three further illustrates these arguments and further subdivides them by
contrasting universal arbitration with what Dietz refers to as specialized
arbitration.
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Part one begins by assessing the caseloads of the major arbitration houses.
During the period of 1970-1990, the caseload doubled.130 The numbers show that
while approximately 3,000 disputes were sent to arbitration between 1920-1980,
3,500 disputes were sent to arbitration in the 1990s.131 The last statistic that Dietz
presents on the number of cases sent to arbitration is that between the years of
1996 and 2005, 5,250 cases were sent to the ICC.132
Dietz then examines the number of disputes submitted to the ICC from
four countries: Germany, India, Bulgaria, and Romania.133 When compared to the
total number of companies operating from these regions, Dietz finds that the
number of companies that actually engage in cross-border arbitration is actually
quite marginal.134 Looking beyond this small sample of countries, Dietz next turns
to the United States. Dietz finds that a mere 0.2 percent of all exporting companies
from the United States are involved in international commercial arbitration.135
Dietz concludes his argument by assessing the financial impact of
commercial arbitration on the economy of Germany. He first takes the German
GDP ($3.3 trillion)and divides that by the number of domestic commercial cases
(50,000) to conclude that one commercial case corresponds to a German
economic value creation of $66 million.136 Next, he divides the volume of world
exports for 2010 ($15.2 trillion) by the number of international commercial cases
filed in 2010 at seven of the major courts (3,039) to get a figure of 5 billion. The
author believes that one case of international arbitration corresponds to an
international economic value creation of $5 billion. Referring back to the German
calculation, he then divides the $5 billion dollar figure by the $66 million figure to
get a result of 76. He concludes that for the impact on the global economy to be
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equal to the impact on the German economy, the German caseload would have to
be 76 times higher.137
Part two of the chapter tries to explain these findings. Dietz identified two
major reasons that companies may be less willing to submit a dispute to
arbitration and may instead prefer national courts. The first is that national laws
offer more predictability and legal certainty.138 In addition to providing the
certainty and stability that business craves, this also turns national law into a
commodity that businesses can shop around for, deciding on one that is favorable
to them and unfamiliar to their competitors.139
The second major reason that companies may be reluctant to utilize
international arbitration has to do with concerns surrounding the enforcement of
awards in the absence of strong international treaties that mandate enforcement.140
Despite their flaws, national courts do provide a strong enforcement procedure
that the arbitration process currently does not. Dietz offers Indonesia as a prime
example of this problem. Despite Indonesia becoming a party to the New York
Convention in 1981, it has been nearly impossible to enforce a foreign arbitral
award in Indonesia.141
The third section of the chapter compares universal arbitration with
specialized arbitration. Specialized arbitration is unique in two primary ways.142
The first is that the contracting parties cannot choose the applicable law.143 Once
parties have chosen to arbitrate under the rules of a particular business
association, such as a maritime law association, they are bound by the rules of that
association.144 Second, specialized arbitration not only provides the expertise
needed to resolve disputes in highly specialized and complicated fields, but it also
provides the enforcement that is needed in international arbitration. For example,
the diamond industry posts pictures of non-complying parties in very public areas
of its exchanges.145 This is not only embarrassing to the non-complying party, but
137
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it also serves as a warning to others in the industry that it would be unwise to do
business with this individual, as the risk that they will not comply with an arbitral
award is exceedingly high.146
The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the authors argument as
well as a short discussion of maritime arbitration. The author’s main point in
including maritime arbitration is to reinforce how important it is for any
arbitration tribunal to have a strong enforcement mechanism for its awards. In the
case of maritime arbitration, this is accomplished through ship arrest.147 When a
non-complying parties’ ship inevitably comes into port, a strong system of
national laws allows the ship to be seized.148 This system of ship arrest creates a
highly effective system in which non-compliance with the orders of these
specialized arbitration tribunals can be extremely costly to actors in this global
market. Such effective enforcement is necessary for arbitration to be viewed as a
reliable alternative to national courts.149
The strength of this chapter is its commentary on the enforcement of
arbitration awards. Without the backing of a national court, arbitrators have had to
find creative ways to enforce their awards. While the general reputational hit that a
non-complying party suffers has some effect, something like ship seizure would
add the extra muscle that arbitration will need going forward.
X. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ON TRADE ?
Written by Thomas Hale, this chapter primarily concerns the effect that the
ratification of the 1958 New York Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards has on a country’s foreign trade. Hale begins by reiterating a common theme
throughout this text, that effective international trade requires credible enforcement.150
One of the ways that countries have achieved this credible enforcement is the enactment
of the 1958 New York Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.151
Hale finds that, in total, when two member nations of the New York Convention agree to
private arbitration, trade between those countries increases by 30% if one country is a
member, and by a staggering 63% if both countries are members.152 Hale goes on to posit
that membership in the New York Convention, as well as membership in the World
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Trade Organization, are forms of global governance that allow for the effective
enforcement that the arbitration field may be missing.153
Hale next lays out the data that his study relies on, as well as his method of
analysis. The trade data is pulled from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics154 while
the GDP data is taken from a number of sources.155 Hale’s model seems a bit overly
statistical for a book that is intended to reach a broad audience within the legal field, most
of whom likely do not possess the mathematical expertise to fully appreciate and/or
critique the model. The model utilizes a wide range of variables to ultimately assess the
impact of membership in the New York Convention and the World Trade Organization
on a country’s bilateral trade.156 Hale ultimately concludes that when one country is a
member of the New York Convention, the trade between the countries increases by 8%,
whereas when both nations are members, their trade increases by 35%.157 The increase in
trade was even more striking when countries were members of the World Trade
Organization.158 When one country is a member of the WTO, trade increases 58%,
whereas when both countries are members, trade increases by an astounding 306%.159
This chapter was one of the shortest in the book and by far the most technical.
However, the ultimate conclusion that there is credible data to show that transnational
agreements that support the enforcement of arbitral awards is exciting. This data lends
credibility to the overarching theme of the book of arbitration as a true type of global
governance.
XI. THE CONTESTED LEGITIMACY OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
RIGHTS ORDEAL : THE MISSING LINK

AND THE

HUMAN

The last chapter is written by Horatia Muir Watt and concerns ways in
which social and economic rights can be introduced into the field of investment
arbitration. Watt takes issue with investors that use the contractual process to
exculpate themselves from the regulations of the home state.160 Watt argues that
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existing investment arbitration tribunals could be used to hold corporate actors
that are the beneficiaries of bilateral investment treaties accountable for human
rights violations.161
Watt identifies the primary issue with holding corporate actors responsible
for alleged human rights violations is finding a proper forum for these cases to be
heard, with the home State’s domestic courts being the most logical place.162
However, because of the strength of the arbitral agreements, it can be quite
difficult to get these claims around the arbitral process and into the jurisdiction of
the national courts.163
To resolve this, Watt believes that the existing international investment
regime is sufficiently able to bridge this gap.164 Watt conceives of a system in
which host states allow the arbitrator to extend their jurisdiction in a proceeding
and take human rights violations suffered by the population of the home State not
a party to the arbitration into account.165 This would seem to place a great deal of
hope in the idea that arbitrators would be a willing actor in this extension of his
rights.
While Watt identifies a real problem in arbitration, namely holding
economic actors responsible for human rights violations, the solution proposed
seems insufficient. Watt’s fix relies heavily on arbitrators to greatly expand their
jurisdiction, something that they may be very reluctant to do. An arbitrator runs
the risk of losing business if he continually goes far beyond what the parties
contracted about. A better solution might be to address any potential violations of
this nature in the contract itself.
XII. CONCLUSION
International Arbitration & Global Governance serves as an effective
introduction to the field of international commercial arbitration. While it does end
up reading as more of a collection of essays than a coherent book with a singular
theme, by utilizing multiple authors, the editors have given the readers a number
of different perspectives on the topic. In an academic setting, the book would best
be utilized by assigning several individual chapters instead of the entire book. As
international arbitration continues to develop, books like this that suggest ways in
which the system can be governed and made more efficient will continue to be
extremely valuable to the field as a whole.
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